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Abstract (242 words) 
Compared with younger adults, older adults have a relative preference to attend to and 
remember positive over negative information. This is known as the “positivity effect,” and 
researchers have typically evoked socioemotional selectivity theory to explain it. According to 
socioemotional selectivity theory, as people get older they begin to perceive their time left in life 
as more limited. These reduced time horizons prompt older adults to prioritize achieving 
emotional gratification and thus exhibit increased positivity in attention and recall. Although this 
is the most commonly cited explanation of the positivity effect, there is currently a lack of clear 
experimental evidence demonstrating a link between time horizons and positivity. The goal of 
the current research was to address this issue. In two separate experiments, we asked participants 
to complete a writing activity, which directed them to think of time as being either limited or 
expansive (Experiments 1 and 2) or did not orient them to think about time in a particular 
manner (Experiment 2). Participants were then shown a series of emotional pictures, which they 
subsequently tried to recall. Results from both studies showed that regardless of chronological 
age, thinking about a limited future enhanced the relative positivity of participants’ recall.  
Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 showed that this effect was not driven by changes in 
mood. Thus, the fact that older adults’ recall is typically more positive than younger adults’ 
recall may index naturally shifting time horizons and goals with age. 
 
Keywords: aging, positivity effect, socioemotional selectivity theory, memory, emotion, time 
perception 
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Thinking about a Limited Future Enhances the Positivity of Younger and Older Adults’ 
Recall: Support for Socioemotional Selectivity Theory 
As people get older, they tend to show a relative preference to attend to and remember 
positive over negative information (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). For example, relative to 
younger adults, older adults preferentially direct their eye gaze towards positive images, and/or 
away from negative images (Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a, 2006b; Knight et al., 2007). Similarly, relative to younger 
adults, older adults usually recall and recognize more positive and fewer negative images 
(Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Knight, 2005), remember more positive 
autobiographical events (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004; Levine & Bluck, 1997), and 
remember their decisions as being associated with more positive outcomes (Mather & Johnson, 
2000). Together, this age-by-valence interaction is known as the positivity effect (Kennedy et al., 
2004). Although some studies have failed to observe the positivity effect (e.g., Gruhn, Smith, & 
Baltes, 2005; Kensinger, Brierley, Medford, Growdon, & Corkin, 2002), a recent meta-analysis 
of 100 empirical studies confirmed that such age-related positivity effects are reliable, and 
increase in magnitude as the age gap between younger and older adults increases (Reed, Chan, & 
Mikels, 2014).  
Although the age-related positivity effect is a robust finding, there is still debate about 
why it occurs. The most widely cited explanation is based upon socioemotional selectivity theory 
(see Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Reed & Carstensen, 2012). According to socioemotional 
selectivity theory (Carstensen, 1993, 1995, 2006), people have a core constellation of social 
goals that operate across the lifespan. For example, people are generally motivated to acquire 
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new knowledge about the world and to satisfy their emotional needs. However, the relative 
salience of specific goals fluctuates as a function of perceptions of time and life expectancy.  
In general, younger adults perceive time as being expansive. This causes them to 
prioritize future-oriented goals, such as acquiring new knowledge and expanding their social 
networks, as these activities will help them prepare for the uncertain future challenges ahead of 
them. Thus, younger adults typically aim to explore the world, to have new experiences, and to 
seek out interactions with novel social partners. In contrast, older adults are more likely to 
appreciate life’s fragility and perceive time as “running out” or being limited. This in turn causes 
them to prioritize present-oriented goals, such as maximizing their emotional well-being. Thus, 
with age, people focus more on savoring life and deepening existing relationships (Carstensen, 
1993, 1995, 2006). 
These time-horizon-induced differences in social goals are in turn hypothesized to lead to 
the positivity effect in attention and memory. When people perceive their time horizons as 
limited they aim to optimize their emotional well-being. One way that this can be accomplished 
is by preferentially attending to and remembering positive over negative information (and hence 
display a positivity effect; see Kryla-Lighthall & Mather, 2009; Reed & Carstensen, 2012).  
Research has consistently supported socioemotional selectivity theory’s prediction that 
fluctuations in time horizons affect social goals.  For example, although there are usually age 
differences in perceived time horizons, this is not always the case. Some situations, such as the 
9/11 attacks on the United States or the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, remind people of all ages 
that life is fragile. In response to these situations, both younger and older adults prioritized the 
goal of maximizing their emotional well-being (Fung & Carstensen, 2006). Similar results 
emerge in studies that experimentally manipulate time horizons and examine how this affects 
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social preferences. For example, in a study by Fung, Carstensen, and Lutz (1999), some younger 
adults were asked to reflect on “running out of time” within their current social circle by 
imagining a hypothetical geographic move. In response to this, these younger adults became 
indistinguishable from older adults in their social goals; both groups equally prioritized spending 
time with familiar social partners, an activity that would likely maximize their emotional well-
being. Conversely, older adults who reflected on the possibility of an expanded time horizon (by 
imagining a medical breakthrough that added 20 years to their life), became indistinguishable 
from younger adults in their social goals; both groups prioritized spending time with novel social 
partners, an activity that would likely maximize knowledge-acquisition. Thus, when time 
horizons are perceived as limited, people focus on maximizing emotional satisfaction regardless 
of their age. Conversely, when time horizons are perceived as expansive, people focus on 
knowledge acquisition (see also Carstensen & Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 1995; Fung & 
Carstensen, 2003).  
Although there is clear evidence that shifting time horizons affect social goals, there is 
less experimental evidence that shifting time horizons also lead to the positivity effect. For 
instance, one study found that first-year college students looked longer at sad faces than did 
college seniors. This was interpreted as occurring because the seniors perceived their college 
time as “running out’ due to their upcoming graduations (Pruzan & Isaacowitz, 2006). Although 
these results are consistent with socioemotional selectivity theory, this experiment was quasi-
experimental in nature and did not directly manipulate time horizons. Without random 
assignment to conditions, it is not clear whether reductions in time horizons were responsible for 
the increased positivity. A different problem arose in a study examining the relationship between 
individual differences in time horizons and visual attention biases on the dot-probe task 
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(Demeyer & De Raedt, 2013). In this study, no relationship was found between these factors. 
However, this study also failed to observe an age-related positivity effect, likely because dot-
probe tasks provide less power to detect positivity effects than eye tracking (Isaacowitz et al., 
2006a). Furthermore, in this study the measure used to assess time horizons had relatively low 
reliability in the older adult sample. Taken together, these two factors likely reduced the ability 
of this study to observe a relationship between time horizons and the positivity effect. 
Other studies have attempted to examine the impact of time horizons on positivity by 
experimentally shifting time horizons. However, it is unclear how effective their manipulations 
of time horizons have been. For example, one study found that students who reflected on their 
own mortality showed greater accessibility of positive emotional information than control groups 
(DeWall & Baumeister, 2007). Likewise, students completing a taste test enjoyed eating a 
chocolate more when they knew it was the last item they would taste (O'Brien & Ellsworth, 
2012). However, it is not clear whether these manipulations affected positivity by changing time 
horizons. Similarly, another study attempted to manipulate time horizons by having participants 
think about events happening in the next two days versus in the next 10 years (Demeyer & De 
Raedt, 2014). Here, no effect was found on attentional biases. However, it is not clear whether 
asking participants to shift their focus to the near future versus far future affected perceived time 
horizons.  
The study with perhaps the cleanest experimental manipulation of time horizons to date 
(Kellough & Knight, 2012) provides some evidence consistent with socioemotional selectivity 
theory. In this study, half of the younger adults imagined that it was their graduation day (i.e., a 
limited time horizon) and half of the younger adults were given no special instructions.  
Likewise, half of the older adults imagined a medical breakthrough that provided 20 additional 
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years of life (i.e., an expansive time horizon) and half of the older adults were given no special 
instructions. All participants then saw emotional faces and indicated which emotion(s) they 
displayed. Consistent with socioemotional selectivity theory, older adults in the expansive time 
horizon condition judged ambiguous emotional faces less positively than did older adults in the 
control condition. However, contrary to expectations, there were no analogous effects for the 
younger adults. This inconsistency may have been due to differences in the way time horizons 
were manipulated for the two age groups. For older adults, time horizons were manipulated to be 
expansive by imagining a lengthened life expectancy.  For younger adults, time horizons were 
manipulated to be limited by imagining their graduation. Although this is the end of a 
developmental stage, it is also the beginning of new opportunities (as students may now begin 
careers and families). In addition, the dependent variable in Kellough & Knight (2012) was 
categorization of facial emotions, a task on which age-related positivity effects are often not 
found (in part because there are age differences in eye gaze patterns that influence how facial 
emotions are interpreted; for a review, see Mather, 2016).  Use of this categorization task rather 
than an attentional or memory task may have reduced the likelihood of finding effects.  
Thus, although the vast majority of positivity effect studies have been interpreted through 
the lens of socioemotional selectivity theory, it remains unclear whether or not positivity effects 
are actually caused by the changes in social goals that arise due to fluctuating time horizons. In 
addition, to our knowledge, no previous study has directly examined the link between time 
horizons and the positivity effect within the domain of memory. The goal of the current research 
was to examine the impact of time horizons on the positivity effect, using the most frequently 
assessed measure of the effect, namely recall of emotional pictures. In two experiments, we 
asked participants to complete a writing activity, which directed them to think of time as being 
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either limited or expansive. In Experiment 1, we included both limited and expansive time 
horizon conditions for both younger and older adults. Experiment 2 also included a control 
condition, which did not orient participants to think about time in a particular manner. Based 
upon socioemotional selectivity theory we predicted that regardless of chronological age, 
thinking about a limited future would lead to enhanced positivity in recall.   
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we manipulated the salience of time horizons in both younger and older 
adult participants via a writing activity. Participants either reflected on how a life expectancy of 
six remaining months (i.e., a limited time horizon) or 120 years (i.e., an expansive time horizon) 
would affect their activities and goals. Participants then saw positive, negative, and neutral 
pictures, which they subsequently tried to recall. Based upon socioemotional selectivity theory, 
we predicted that our time horizon manipulation should affect the positivity of participants’ 
recall, with enhanced positivity for participants in the limited, compared to expansive, time 
horizon condition.  
Method 
Participants  
A total of 161 individuals (81 older and 80 younger adults) from the Los Angeles area 
participated in this study. Due to a computer failure, data from two older adult participants were 
lost. We also excluded data from four non-native English speakers (two older and two younger 
adults), and from two individuals (one older and one younger adult) who did not complete the 
writing activity (described below) within the allotted ten minutes (i.e., they were still writing 
their responses and/or had not answered a question). This left a final sample of 76 older adults 
and 77 younger adults in the following analyses. Of this final sample, older adults were on 
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average 69.47 years old (SD = 5.27; range = 61 to 80 years) whereas younger adults were on 
average 20.30 years old (SD = 2.56; range = 18 to 34 years). Older adults had completed more 
years of education (M = 17.88) than younger adults (M = 13.87), who were still students at the 
time of this study, t(150) = 14.21, p < .001, d = 2.32.1  
There were significantly more men in the older adult sample (50%) than in the younger 
adult sample (18%). However, randomization to experimental writing condition was done 
separately for men and women in each age group. Because of this, within each age group there 
was an approximately equal number of men assigned to the limited time horizon condition (18 
older and 7 younger men) as to the expansive time horizon condition (20 older and 7 younger 
men). None of the reported patterns of results changed when including gender as a covariate. 
Participants were recruited through the University of Southern California (USC) 
psychology participant pool and a list of volunteers associated with the USC Leonard Davis 
School of Gerontology. Upon completion of the study, participants were compensated either 1 
credit/hour towards their psychology course requirements or $15/hour.  
Procedure.  
Participants first completed a demographics form. They were then randomly assigned to 
either the limited time horizon condition or to the expansive time horizon condition. The 
manipulations used in these conditions were modeled after previous work by Fung and 
colleagues (1999) examining how time horizons affect social goals. 
In the Limited Time Horizon condition participants completed a writing activity in which 
they reflected on a shortened life expectancy and the need to spend more time focusing on the 
                                                          
1 For the three older adult participants who indicated they had “16+ years” of education we assumed 17 years of 
education. For the one older adult participant who indicated they had completed trade school we assumed 14 years 
of education. One older adult participant did not answer this question. 
 TIME HORIZONS MODULATE THE POSITIVITY EFFECT  11 
 
present (for the full text, see Appendix A). These participants spent at least five minutes writing 
about how knowing they only had six months left to live would change their current spending 
and saving plans as well as the activities they spent time on. They also described how they would 
like to spend the last day of their life, and what their life goals would be if they knew they only 
had six more months left to live.  
In contrast, in the Expansive Time Horizon condition participants completed a writing 
activity in which they reflected on an increased life expectancy (for the full text, see Appendix 
A). These participants spent at least five minutes writing about how knowing they would live in 
good health to the age of 120 would change their spending and saving plans as well as the 
activities they spent time on. They also described how they would like to spend their days after 
they reached age 100, and what their life goals would be if they knew they would live to be 120 
years old. 
 Participants in both conditions were left alone for five minutes to complete the writing 
activity. If participants were not finished when the experimenter returned, they were given up to 
five additional minutes to finish answering the questions. For example transcriptions from both 
younger and older adults in each of the conditions, see Appendix A.  For analyses of the 
linguistic content of participants’ writing activity responses, please see the Supplementary 
Materials.  
To determine the efficacy of this writing activity in changing time horizons we conducted 
a supplementary study. Here, we recruited an additional set of 131 younger adults (M = 25.17 
years old; range = 18-35) and 120 older adults (M = 57.72 years old; range = 50-74) from 
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website.2 Participants were randomly assigned to complete either the 
limited or expansive time horizon writing activity that was just described. They then used a 
sliding scale to indicate how far they felt they had progressed in their life. Results of a 2 (Age 
group) X 2 (Time horizon) ANOVA showed a significant main effect of age, F(1, 247) = 457.81, 
MSE = 190.47, p < .001, ηp² = .65. Not surprisingly, older adults felt they had less time 
remaining in life than did younger adults. Of relevance to this study, there was also an effect of 
time horizon condition, F(1, 247) = 3.74, MSE = 190.47, p = .05, ηp² = .02, which did not interact 
with age, F(1, 247) = 2.29, MSE = 190.47, p = .13, ηp² = .01. Participants in the limited time 
horizon condition felt they had less time remaining in life than did participants in the expansive 
time horizon condition. Thus, results from this supplementary study supports that our 
manipulation shifts time horizons similarly across age groups.  
Within Experiment 1, immediately after the writing activity, participants completed an 
emotional memory task. Participants were shown a series of 70 pictures (drawn from those used 
by Mather and Knight, 2005; Experiment 2 and selected to be distinguishable from one another 
based upon verbal descriptions). Of these, 14 pictures were neutral, 28 were positive, and 28 
were negative in valence. The majority of the pictures came from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999).3 However, two neutral pictures came 
from additional sources. Within the positive and negative valence categories, an equal number 
                                                          
2 An additional 39 participants completed this supplementary study but were excluded either because their IP 
address was associated with multiple responses, they were not a native English speaker, or their speed of completing 
the study suggested they did not answer the questions seriously. 
3 Negative high arousal pictures: IAPS numbers 3110, 3180, 3350, 3500, 6230, 6350, 9040, 9410, 9500, 9611, 9621, 
9810, and 9911.  Negative low arousal pictures: IAPS numbers 1112, 1275, 2490, 2590, 2700, 2750, 3300, 5970, 
6000, 9001, 9007, 9330, 9470, and 9830.  Neutral pictures: IAPS numbers 2200, 2840, 5510, 5731, 5920, 7010, 
7090, 7130, 7150, 7170, 7217, 7640, and 2 additional pictures from additional sources. Positive high arousal 
pictures: IAPS numbers 4220, 4608, 5260, 5460, 5470, 5621, 5629, 7270, 7502, 8030, 8300, 8370, 8470, and 8501. 
Positive low arousal pictures: IAPS numbers 1463, 1590, 2091, 2260, 2352, 2540, 2550, 2650, 4700, 5220, 5300, 
5660, 5982, and 7480. 
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(14) of pictures were low and high in emotional arousal.  Previous results from Mather and 
Knight (2005; Experiment 2) showed that younger and older adults did not differ in their valence 
or arousal ratings of these pictures. Pictures appeared in a single random order at a rate of one 
picture every two seconds. As in Mather and Knight (2005), participants were asked to view the 
pictures the same way that they would watch television and were also informed that their 
memory for the pictures would later be tested. After viewing the pictures, participants completed 
a self-paced free recall test. Here, participants described aloud as many of the pictures as they 
could recall while the experimenter sat beside them and typed their responses into the computer.  
The transcribed responses were visible to both the experimenter and the participants throughout 
the memory test.  There were no audio and video recordings. 
Results 
A picture was scored as correctly recalled if the participant provided a description that a 
rater determined to clearly match the picture.  The recalled pictures were then classified by 
valence based upon their IAPS ratings. In total, 78 of the 3,223 responses (2.4%) could not be 
matched to presented pictures. Most of the unscored responses were descriptions that were too 
general to be matched to a picture (e.g., ‘someone laughing or smiling’, ‘scenery picture’). We 
next conducted a 2 (Age group) X 2 (Time horizon) ANOVA on the number of responses 
provided by each participant that could not be scored.  Results of this analysis showed that older 
adults were more likely to provide responses that could not be scored (M = 0.67 responses per 
participant) than younger adults (M = .32), F(1, 149) = 6.20, MSE = 0.74, p = .01, ηp² = .04. 
However, there was no main effect of time horizon condition, F < 1, or interaction between time 
horizon condition and age, F < 1 on the number of responses that could not be scored. To ensure 
that the ratings were reliable, a second rater independently coded for the presence or absence of 
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each picture in all of the recall protocols.  Reliability with the primary rater was extremely high, 
Cohen’s kappa = 0.96, p < .001.  
We next examined how age and time horizon condition affected the total number of 
pictures recalled (collapsing across valence; see Table 1). As expected, a 2 (Age group) X 2 
(Time horizon) ANOVA on total recall showed no significant main effect of time horizon 
condition, F (1, 149) = 0.02, MSE = 62.26, p = .88, ηp² < .001, and no interaction between age 
group and time horizon condition, F (1, 149) = 0.97, MSE = 62.26, p = .33, ηp² = .006.  However, 
surprisingly within this analysis there was no main effect of age group, F (1, 149) = 0.39, MSE = 
62.26, p = .54, ηp² = .003.  Further analyses showed that this null effect was likely due to age 
differences in time spent on the self-paced free recall test.  Within a 2 (Age group) X 2 (Time 
Horizon condition) ANOVA on recall times there was a main effect of age, F(1, 149) = 23.34, 
MSE = 16207.57, p < .001, ηp² = .14, such that older adults elected to spend more time on the test 
(M = 313.70 s) than did younger adults (M = 214.22 s). Recall time was in turn positively 
correlated with the amount recalled, r = .59, p < .001.  Importantly, after accounting for recall 
time, a standard age difference in total recall emerged.  Within a 2 (Age group) X 2 (Time 
horizon) ANCOVA on total recall there was a significant main effect of age such that older 
adults recalled significantly fewer pictures (adjusted M = 18.11) than younger adults (adjusted M 
= 21.07), F (1, 150) = 7.54, MSE = 38.73, p = .007, ηp² = .05. However, within this ANCOVA 
there was still no main effect of time horizon condition, F (1, 148) = 1.10, MSE = 38.92, p = .30, 
ηp² = 01, and no interaction between age group and time horizon condition, F (1, 148) = 0.15, 
MSE = 38.92, p = .70, ηp² = .001, suggesting that our manipulation did not affect overall levels of 
recall. 
 TIME HORIZONS MODULATE THE POSITIVITY EFFECT  15 
 
The positivity effect has been defined as an age-by-valence interaction, in which older 
adults’ recall is proportionally more positive, and less negative, than younger adults’ recall 
(Kryla-Lighthall & Mather, 2009).  To capture this shift towards positive and away from 
negative, in the current study we calculated the relative positivity of each participant’s 
recall.  We defined this as the number of positive pictures recalled minus the number of negative 
pictures recalled divided by the total number of pictures recalled. Positive scores indicate a 
propensity to recall the positive rather than negative pictures. In contrast, negative scores 
indicate a propensity to recall the negative rather than positive pictures. A key strength of this 
relative index of positivity is that it also accounts for the large variability in total recall, which in 
the current study ranged from 4 to 49 pictures. For the total number of items recalled from each 
valence category as a function of age and time horizon condition, see Table 1.   
We next turned to the primary purpose of Experiment 1: Did the manipulation of time 
horizons affect whether people preferentially recalled positive or negative pictures? To answer 
this, we conducted a 2 (Age group) X 2 (Time horizon) ANOVA on the positivity of recall. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, within this analysis there was a significant main effect of time 
horizon condition, F(1, 149) = 5.17, MSE = .04, p = .024, ηp² = .03, which did not interact with 
age, F < 1. As can be seen in Figure 1, the positivity of participants’ recall was higher in the 
limited time horizon condition than in the expansive time horizon condition.  
Although the effect of our time horizon manipulation was age-invariant, within this 
ANOVA there was also a main effect of age, indicative of an age-related positivity effect, F(1, 
149) = 10.04, MSE = .04, p = .002, ηp² = .06. As shown in Figure 1, within each of the time 
horizon conditions the positivity of older adults’ recall was higher than that of younger adults’ 
recall. 
 TIME HORIZONS MODULATE THE POSITIVITY EFFECT  16 
 
An interesting additional observation is that the magnitude of the positivity bias was 
dependent upon participants’ overall levels of recall.  Lower levels of recall were associated with 
significantly higher levels of positivity in the limited time horizon condition (partial correlation 
controlling for age group: r = -0.26, p = 0.02) and marginally with lower levels of positivity in 
the expansive time horizon condition (partial correlation controlling for age group: r = .20, p = 
.09).  Thus, the biases prompted by the time horizon manipulation were especially apparent in 
the participants who performed poorly on the memory test. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1 younger and older adults reflected on either a limited or expansive time 
horizon before completing an emotional memory task. Results were consistent with 
socioemotional selectivity theory. Regardless of chronological age, reflecting on a limited time 
horizon was associated with higher positivity in recall compared to reflecting on an expansive 
time horizon. Although the results of Experiment 1 were consistent with the socioemotional 
selectivity theory’s hypotheses, there were also some limitations to this study. First, we did not 
include a control condition. Thus, it is unclear whether our limited time horizon manipulation 
increased the positivity of recall, whether the expansive time horizon manipulation decreased the 
positivity of recall, or whether both effects simultaneously occurred. Second, we did not include 
measures of mood. It is possible that reflecting on the possibility of having only six months to 
live induces a negative mood state, which in turn might affect the positivity of participants’ 
recall. It is also possible that reflecting on the possibility of living up to 120 changes individuals’ 
affective states; however, the direction of this effect was less clear.  In Experiment 1 there was a 
variety of responses to the expansive time horizon manipulation.  Some participants wrote about 
using this extended lifespan to pursue pleasurable novel activities (e.g., travelling the world, 
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becoming a teacher).  However, other participants wrote about plans to be frugal (in order to 
financially support this extended lifespan) and about fears that their loved ones would not have a 
similarly long lifespan.  
Experiment 2 
To address the two limitations of Experiment 1 outlined above, we conducted a second 
experiment. Here, we included a control writing condition, in which participants were not 
oriented to think about time in a particular manner, but rather described activities that they had 
completed that day.  This allowed us to determine whether participants in the limited time 
horizon condition show enhanced positivity in recall, whether participants in the expansive time 
horizon condition show reduced positivity in recall, or whether both effects occur 
simultaneously. We also included assessments of mood. This allowed us to determine whether 
reflecting on a limited future induces a negative mood state, and how this in turn affects the 
positivity of participants’ recall.  
Method 
Participants  
A total of 150 adults (46 women) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk), an online portal that connects people willing to do short web-based tasks with people 
who need those tasks completed. Data obtained from mTurk participants has high test-retest 
reliability (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and does not significantly differ from data 
obtained from in-person lab study participants (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) 
Participants were compensated $1 upon completion of the study.  
Of the 150 participants, we excluded 13 who reported having participated in a prior 
mTurk experiment using the same emotional pictures and 24 who reported a computer error in 
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which the file names of the emotional pictures appeared alongside the pictures.4 We also 
excluded two participants who failed to recall any of the critical pictures. This left a final sample 
of 111 participants: 39 in the expansive time horizon condition, 33 in the limited time horizon 
condition, and 39 in the control condition. This sample was on average 31.88 years old (SD = 
9.52). Although participants ranged in age from 20 to 71, we did not recruit participants based 
upon their age.  Because of this, the distribution of age was not normally distributed: 47.7% of 
participants were aged 20 to 29, 33.4% were aged 30 to 39, 13.5% were aged 40 to 49, 4.5% 
were aged 50 to 59, and only 0.9% were aged 60 or older. Participant age did not differ between 
the three experimental conditions, F(1, 108) = 0.78, MSE = 91.48, p = .46, ηp² = .01. 
By chance, the three experimental conditions marginally differed in the number of 
women assigned to them, F (2, 108) = 2.94, MSE = 0.24, p = .06, ηp² = .05.  There was a 
numerically lower proportion of women in the limited time horizon condition (24.2%) than in 
either the expansive time horizon (48.7%) or control condition (48.7%). However, Bonferonni-
corrected post-hoc comparisons showed that these differences were not statistically significant. 
The reported patterns of results do not change when including gender as a covariate. 
Participants had a broad range of educational backgrounds: 0.9% had completed some 
high school, 11.7% had a high school diploma, 32.4% had ‘some college’, 17.1% had a 2-year 
Associates level college degree, 33.3% had a 4-year Bachelor’s level college degree, 3.6% had a 
Master’s degree, and 0.9% had a Ph.D., J.D., or M.D. degree. By chance, education significantly 
differed among the three experimental conditions, F(2, 108) = 4.06, MSE = 1.35, p = .02, ηp² = 
.07. Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc analyses showed that this was because participants randomly 
                                                          
4 Pretesting revealed that the file names of pictures sometimes appeared, and this was associated with a delay in the 
pictures loading. Because of this, at the end of this study we explicitly asked all participants whether or not the file 
names had appeared during encoding. 
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assigned to the control condition had significantly higher levels of educational attainment than 
those assigned to the limited time horizon condition, p = .02. No other pairwise comparison was 
significant (all p’s > .29). The reported patterns of results do not change when including 
education as a covariate.  
Procedure.  
As a baseline measure of mood, participants first completed the Positive and Negative 
Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This 20-item questionnaire lists 10 
positive and 10 negative emotional adjectives and participants rate the extent to which they are 
currently feeling each adjective. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to either the limited time horizon, expansive 
time horizon, or control condition. These conditions differed only in the writing activity that was 
next completed. The instructions for the writing activities used in the limited and expansive time 
horizon conditions were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with one exception – here, the 
sentences stating that participants should assume good health were printed in bold and 
underlined. As described in the Supplementary Material, in Experiment 1 participants in the 
expansive time horizon condition were more likely to write about their health despite the fact 
that instructions in both conditions stated that participants should assume good health. In 
Experiment 2, we examined whether this linguistic difference would remain when these 
statements were highlighted. Please see the Supplementary Materials for more details on these 
linguistic analyses. 
In contrast to the other two conditions, the control condition’s writing activity did not 
include a preamble asking participants to think about time in a specific manner. Rather, these 
participants responded to four questions about their current daily activities (see Appendix B), 
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which were designed to be similar in topic to those answered in the limited and expansive time 
horizon conditions (see Appendix A). For example, whereas participants in the limited and 
expansive time horizon conditions speculated on their daily activities would be affected by 
changes in life expectancy, participants in the control condition listed the activities they had 
completed that day.  For analyses of the linguistic content of participants’ writing activity 
responses, please see the Supplementary Materials.   
Immediately after the writing activity, participants in all three conditions indicated their 
mood using a sliding scale. Responses could range from 0 (very negative mood) to 100 (very 
positive mood).   
Participants next completed an emotional picture memory task. The picture stimuli used 
in this task were seven positively-valenced and seven negatively-valenced pictures drawn from 
the IAPS (Lang et al., 1999).5 They were all low in arousal, and arousal level did not differ 
between the positive and negative pictures. In contrast to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we used 
an incidental encoding task.  This procedural change was made for two reasons.  First, it ensured 
that participants did not make notes about the pictures for the upcoming memory test.  Second, it 
was expected to increase the likelihood of observing a positivity effect; results of a recent meta-
analysis suggest that the positivity effect is larger during incidental compared to intentional 
encoding (Reed, et al., 2014).  During the incidental encoding task pictures were shown in a 
single random order. The picture slideshow progressed automatically, and participants could not 
go back and review pictures after they had disappeared. Each picture was shown with either a red 
or yellow border, and participants were asked to indicate the border’s color. Since this was an 
                                                          
5 Negative pictures: IAPS numbers 1112, 1275, 2490, 9001, 9415, and 9830.  Positive pictures: IAPS numbers 1463, 
2260, 2540, 2550, 2650, 5660, and 7350.  There were images of people in four of the negative and in four of the 
positive pictures.  
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online study, this ensured that participants attended to all of the pictures during the encoding 
period. Each picture was shown for five seconds.  This was an increase in exposure time 
compared to Experiment 1 (in which each picture was shown for only two seconds). This 
procedural change ensured that participants had adequate time to both note the color of the 
border and also attend to the content of each picture.  Across participants each picture appeared 
equally often with a red border as it did with a yellow border. To buffer against primacy and 
recency effects, we also included four non-critical neutral pictures, two of which appeared at the 
beginning of the slideshow and two at the end. Immediately after viewing the pictures, 
participants completed a surprise, self-paced, free recall test. Here, they typed short descriptions 
of as many of the pictures as they could recall.  
Finally, at the end of the study participants provided demographics information and also 
indicated whether they had encountered any technical problems or had seen the emotional 
picture stimuli in a previous experiment. 
Results 
A picture was scored as correctly recalled if the participant provided a description that 
matched the picture. Recalled pictures were classified by valence according to their IAPS 
ratings. Only 33 of the 690 responses could not be scored (4.8%); a single-factor between-groups 
ANOVA on the number of non-scored responses provided by each participants showed no 
significant difference among the three conditions, F(1, 108) = 1.31, MSE = 0.37, p = .28, ηp² = 
.02. To ensure reliability of the ratings, a second rater independently coded for the presence of 
the 14 critical pictures in each of the recall protocols. As in Experiment 1, reliability with the 
primary rater was high, Cohen’s kappa = 0.93, p < .001.  A single-factor between-groups 
ANOVA confirmed that there was no significant difference among the three conditions in the 
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total number of pictures recalled, F (2, 108) = 0.45, MSE = 5.77, p = .64, ηp² = .008 (see Table 
2).   
 We next turned to the first primary aim of Experiment 2: Did the positivity of recall differ 
between the three conditions? To answer this, we conducted a single-factor between-groups 
ANOVA on the relative positivity of participants’ recall. As in Experiment 1, we defined this as 
the number of items recalled that were positive minus the number that were negative divided by 
the total number of items recalled (for the number of items recalled as a function of valence and 
time horizon condition see Table 2). As shown in Figure 2, the positivity of participants’ recall 
significantly differed among these three conditions, F(2, 108) = 3.17, MSE = .20, p = .046, ηp² = 
.06. In follow-up independent t-tests, participants’ recall in the limited time horizon condition 
was marginally more positive than that of participants in the expansive time horizon condition, 
t(70) = 1.93, p = .057, d = .46, and significantly more positive than that of participants in the 
control condition, t(70) = 2.50, p = .015, d = .60. In contrast, the positivity of recall did not differ 
between participants in the expansive time horizon and control conditions, t(76) = 0.48, p = .63, 
d = .11. Thus, whereas a focus on limited time horizons increased the positivity of recall, a focus 
on expansive time horizons did not decrease it. 
As in Experiment 1, the magnitude of the positivity bias in the limited time horizon 
condition was negatively associated with the participants’ overall levels of recall (r = -0.69, p < 
.001), such that lower overall recall was related to a stronger positive bias. However, unlike in 
Experiment 1, there was no significant correlation between total recall levels and the magnitude 
of the positivity effect in the expansive future condition (r = -0.21, p = .20).  There was also no 
relationship between these variables in the control conditions (r = 0.07, p = .65). 
Mood and free recall 
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Our second aim was to test the role of mood in modulating our results. We hypothesized 
that reflecting on a limited future would induce a negative mood. However, it was unclear how 
this would in turn affect the positivity of recall. On the one hand, there could be a negative 
correlation between these factors; a reduced mood in the limited time horizon condition could 
lead to enhanced positivity if people selectively recall the positive pictures as a means of 
enhancing positive emotion. In other words, mood could serve as a mediating variable and 
explain why our time horizon manipulation affected the positivity of participants’ recall. On the 
other hand, there could be a positive correlation between these factors; a reduced mood could 
lead people to engage in mood-congruent processing and attenuate the positivity of their recall. 
In other words, a reduced mood in the limited time horizon condition could serve as a suppressor 
variable, reducing the predictive strength of our time horizon manipulation in accounting for the 
subsequent positivity of participants’ recall.  
To address these questions, we first examined whether our time horizon manipulation 
affected mood. At the outset of the study, mood (as assessed via the PANAS) did not differ 
between the conditions; a single-factor between-group ANOVA revealed no significant 
differences in either positive or negative PANAS scores among the three conditions, F(1, 108) = 
0.71, MSE = 74.35, p = .50, ηp² = .01 and F(1, 108) = 0.35, MSE = 16.45, p = .70, ηp² = .01, 
respectively. In contrast, after completing the writing activity, mood (as assessed via a sliding 
scale from 0 to 100) significantly differed among the conditions, F(2, 108) = 4.60, MSE = 
501.17, p = .01, ηp² = .08.6 Follow-up independent t-tests showed that after the writing activity, 
participants in the limited time horizon condition were in a significantly worse mood (M = 60.18) 
                                                          
6 One limitation of this study is that the mood measures used pre and post writing differed. Although participants in 
the three conditions did not significantly differ in their positive or negative PANAS scores prior to the writing 
activity it is possible that they would have differed in their responses to the one-question sliding scale measure of 
mood. 
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than participants in either the expansive time horizon (M = 72.41), t(70) = -2.08, p = .04, d = .50, 
or control condition (M = 75.56), t(70) = -3.28, p = .002, d = .79. Mood did not vary between 
participants in the expansive time horizon and control conditions, t(76) = -.63, p = .53, d = .14. 
Thus, whereas a focus on limited time horizons induced a negative mood, a focus on expansive 
time horizons did not significantly affect mood either positively or negatively.   
 How did mood affect the positivity of participants’ recall? Across the three conditions 
there was a positive correlation between these two variables; the higher the participants’ mood 
the greater their positivity of recall, r = .23, p = .015. Thus, collapsing across the three 
conditions, people engaged in mood-congruent processing and had a tendency to recall the 
positive pictures when in a positive mood. 
In summary, the previous results have shown (a) that participants in the limited time 
horizon condition were in a worse mood, (b) that a lower mood was generally associated with 
lower positivity in recall, (c) that despite their lower mood (and thus their propensity to engage 
in mood-congruent processing and display a negativity bias), participants in the limited time 
horizon condition surprisingly had higher positivity in recall than participants in the other two 
conditions. Taken together, these results suggest that changes in mood do not mediate the 
relationship between our time horizon manipulation and the positivity of recall.  Rather, 
reflecting on a limited future appears to enhance the positivity of recall (presumably because of 
reduced time horizons) but the strength of this relationship may be suppressed by the 
accompanying negative mood that is induced. To test this, we next used the logic of a mediation 
analysis to examine whether the strength of the direct path between our time horizon 
manipulation and the positivity of participants’ recall would change after accounting for mood 
(see Figure 3). In a typical mediation analysis the strength of the direct path is weakened after 
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accounting for the intervening (mediating) variable. In contrast to this, we expected the strength 
of the direct path to be enhanced after accounting for the intervening (suppressive) variable.   
As shown in Figure 3, in separate regression analyses we found that time horizon 
condition (entered as 0 for either the expansive time horizon or control condition and as 1 for the 
limited time horizon condition) was significantly related to both mood and the positivity of 
recall. We then conducted another regression analysis where time horizon condition and mood 
were simultaneously entered as predictors of the positivity of recall. Here, both time horizon 
condition and mood predicted the positivity of recall. Furthermore, the relationship between time 
horizon condition and the positivity of recall was significantly strengthened after accounting for 
mood, Sobel test Z = -2.20, p = .028.  
Discussion 
Replicating Experiment 1 results, participants in the limited time horizon condition 
displayed higher positivity than participants in the expansive time horizon condition. Novel to 
Experiment 2, we also included a control writing condition. Compared to this condition, we 
found that thinking about a limited future increased the positivity of recall. In contrast, a focus on 
expansive time horizons did not decrease it. 
We also examined the role of mood in modulating the observed effects. We found that 
reflecting on a limited future lowered mood. However, this did not explain why participants in 
the limited time horizon condition had enhanced positivity in recall. Overall, our results showed 
that reflecting on a limited life expectancy enhanced the positivity of recall, likely by reducing 
time horizons and increasing participants’ motivation to optimize their emotional experience. 
However, this enhanced positivity was attenuated by the accompanying negative mood state that 
was induced by reflecting on having only six months left to live.   
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General Discussion 
Across a variety of cognitive domains, older adults show a relative preference (compared 
with younger adults) towards positive and/or away from negative information. This is known as 
the positivity effect (Charles et al., 2003), and is typically explained by socioemotional selectivity 
theory (e.g., Carstensen, et al., 1999). According to this view, as people get older they begin to 
perceive time as more limited and this causes them to prioritize goals related to enhancing their 
current emotional satisfaction. One way this can be achieved is by focusing on and remembering 
positive (rather than negative) information (i.e., by displaying a positivity effect; see Kryla-
Lighthall & Mather, 2009; Reed & Carstensen, 2012).  
Although age-related changes in time horizons are frequently theorized to cause the 
positivity effect, previous research either did not directly test this assumption or yielded unclear 
results (Demeyer & De Raedt, 2013, 2014; DeWall & Baumeister, 2007; Pruzan & Isaacowitz, 
2006, but see Kellough & Knight, 2012). In two experiments we examined the effect of 
manipulating time horizons on emotional picture memory recall. Results of both experiments 
were consistent with socioemotional selectivity theory. In Experiment 1 we found that reflecting 
on a limited time horizon was associated with enhanced positivity in recall compared to 
reflecting on an expansive time horizon. This was equally true for both younger and older adults. 
In Experiment 2 we replicated the effect of time horizon on memory positivity. Novel to this 
study, we also included a control condition. Compared to this control condition, reflecting on a 
limited time horizon increased the positivity of recall. In contrast, reflecting on an expansive 
time horizon did not decrease it.  
In Experiment 2 we also demonstrated that the effects of our time horizon manipulation 
on the positivity in recall could not be explained by changes in mood. Not surprisingly, reflecting 
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on a limited future reduced mood. However, despite this mood effect, limiting time horizon 
increased memory positivity. Accounting for the variance due to mood significantly increased 
the predictive power of our time horizon manipulation in explaining the magnitude of the 
positivity of recall. These results suggest that while the limited time horizon manipulation both 
decreased mood and increased memory positivity, it is unlikely that the increased positivity 
effect in the limited time horizon condition is due to negative mood in younger adults. In 
addition, mood also cannot explain the results from Experiment 1. Previous research has shown 
that whereas younger adults display mood-congruent effects, older adults display mood-
incongruent effects (Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008). Thus, if our limited time 
horizon writing manipulation also induced a negative mood state in Experiment 1, it should lead 
to increased negativity in recall in younger adults (a mood-congruent effect) but to increased 
positivity in recall in older adults (a mood-incongruent effect). However, this was not the pattern 
of results that was observed in Experiment 1. Rather, the effects of our writing activity in 
Experiment 1 were age-invariant. Taken together, our results suggest the role of perceived time 
horizon rather than mood in the positivity effect.   
There are limitations to our studies that should be addressed in future research. First, as in 
previous studies that have examined the relationship between time horizons and the positivity 
effect in attention (e.g., DeWall & Baumeister, 2007; Kellough & Knight, 2012; Pruzan & 
Isaacowitz, 2006), in the current study we chose not to directly measure whether time horizons 
differed between our conditions. We reasoned that directly assessing time horizons could cause 
participants to notice the effect of the writing activity on their perceptions of time. This could 
then cause them to mentally “reset” their time horizons to their pre-experiment levels, thereby 
leaving them unaffected by the manipulation during the subsequent memory task. In Experiment 
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2 assessing time horizons would also have caused participants in the control condition to begin 
thinking about time differently. Although our supplementary study (see Experiment 1 Method) 
showed that our writing activity was effective in changing time horizons, future research should 
examine the role of perceived time horizons in the positivity of recall directly. 
Second, participants in Experiment 2 were almost all younger adults. For these 
participants, thinking about a limited future enhanced the positivity of recall but thinking about 
an expansive future did not reduce the positivity of recall (relative to the control condition). 
However, it is possible that a different pattern would emerge for older adult participants. 
Whereas shortening younger adults’ time horizons may be easier than lengthening them, the 
reverse may be true for older adults. Because of this, the positivity of older adults’ recall may be 
equivalent in the limited time horizon and control condition, but less positive in the expansive 
time horizon condition. 
Third, although we included measures of mood in Experiment 2, we did not assess mood 
after the recall test. According to socioemotional selectivity theory, positivity effects emerge as a 
means of regulating emotions. Because of this, individuals who displayed enhanced positivity in 
their recall should have also shown the greatest stability or improvement in their mood over the 
course of the experiment (e.g., Isaacowitz, Toner, & Neupert, 2009; Kennedy et al., 2004). 
Although the focus of these studies was to demonstrate a link between time horizons and the 
positivity of recall, future research should also examine how time horizons and the positivity 
effect may together influence participants’ affective states.  
Of note, although the age-related positivity effect is typically explained according to 
socioemotional selectivity theory (e.g., Carstensen, et al., 1999), at least two other theoretical 
frameworks have also been put forward. First, Cacioppo and colleagues’ (2011) aging-brain 
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model proposes that there is age-related neural degeneration of the amygdala and this results in 
dampened amygdala responsiveness to negative stimuli. This in turn decreases the preferential 
processing advantage that typically occurs for negative stimuli (see Baumeister, Bratlavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) and leads to age-related positivity effects. However, the results of 
our experiments cannot be explained by this framework; the brief time horizon manipulation task 
used in the current experiments would not cause amygdala neural degeneration. Other evidence 
also argues against this aging-brain model of older adults’ positivity effect (Nashiro, Sakaki, & 
Mather, 2012). 
Second, according to Labouvie-Vief’s (2003, 2009) dynamic cognition-emotion 
integration theory people have two modes of processing affective information.  One mode is 
affect optimization, which refers to the tendency to process the information in a manner that 
increases positive affect. The second mode is affect complexity, which is the ability to coordinate 
experiencing both positive and negative affective states. According to dynamic integration theory 
these two modes are dynamically coordinated such that when one decreases the other tends to 
increase (Labouvie-Vief & Medler, 2002). Because of age-related cognitive declines, older 
adults are proposed to have less affective complexity (see Labouvie-Vief, Diehl, Jain, & Zhang, 
2007). This in turn should lead to increases in affect optimization, and hence an age-related 
positivity effect.  However, this theory cannot readily explain the current results. It is unclear 
why reflecting on a limited future would affect cognitive abilities or reduce affective complexity. 
Thus, our results do not support the dynamic integration theory but rather fit with socioemotional 
selectivity theory. 
In summary, a large number of studies have demonstrated a positivity effect in older 
adults’ attention and memory (Reed et al., 2014). However, to our knowledge, the current 
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experiments are the first to explicitly test the socioemotional selectivity theory hypothesis that a 
direct manipulation of time horizons should influence the positivity of participants’ recall. 
Results from two experiments support socioemotional selectivity theory; reflecting on a limited 
future enhanced the positivity of both younger and older adults’ recall. Thus, the fact that older 
adults’ recall is typically more positive than younger adults’ recall may index naturally shifting 
goals with age. 
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Table 1 
Total number of pictures recalled as a function of participant age, time horizon condition, and 
picture valence in Experiment 1.  
 Younger adults Older adults 
 
       
Expansive time 
horizon 
 
Limited time 
horizon 
 
Expansive time 
horizon 
 
Limited time 
horizon 
 
Positive pictures 8.49 (3.96) 8.18 (3.79)  8.82 (3.53) 9.84 (3.34)  
Negative pictures 9.15 (3.79) 8.13 (4.05)  8.10 (3.31) 8.32 (4.22)  
Neutral pictures 2.10 (1.50) 2.37 (2.07)  2.36 (1.63) 2.57 (2.03)  
Total recall 19.74 (7.87) 18.68 (8.41)  19.28 (7.18) 20.73 (8.08)  
 
 
Note: There were 28 positive, 28 negative pictures, and 14 neutral pictures, for a total of 70 
pictures.   
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Table 2 
Total number of pictures recalled as a function of time horizon condition and picture valence in 
Experiment 2.  
  
Expansive time 
horizon condition 
 
 
Control  
condition 
 
Limited time  
horizon condition 
 
Positive pictures  
 
2.33 (1.28) 
 
2.56 (1.47) 
 
2.55 (0.94) 
 
Negative pictures 
 
2.33 (1.63) 
 
2.49 (1.52) 
 
2.00 (1.56) 
 
Total recall 
 
 
4.67 (2.35) 
 
5.05 (2.60) 
 
4.55 (2.21) 
 
 
Note: There were 7 positive and 7 negative pictures, for a total of 14 pictures.  Numbers in 
parentheses represent standard deviations.  Of note, recall levels were lower in Experiment 2 
than in Experiment 1 because of procedural differences at encoding.  Whereas encoding was 
incidental during Experiment 2 it was intentional during Experiment 1.  This change to incidental 
encoding likely also led to the larger positivity effects in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 (see 
Reed et al., 2014).     
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Figure 1 
Positivity of participants’ recall as a function of age and time horizon condition in Experiment 1. 
Positivity was calculated as the number of positive pictures recalled minus the number of 
negative pictures recalled divided by the total number of pictures recalled. Error bars represent 
+/- SE mean. 
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Figure 2 
Positivity of participants’ recall as a function of time horizon condition in Experiment 2. 
Positivity was calculated as the number of positive pictures recalled minus the number of 
negative pictures recalled divided by the total number of pictures recalled. Error bars represent 
+/- SE mean. 
 
 
  
 TIME HORIZONS MODULATE THE POSITIVITY EFFECT  40 
 
Figure 3 
The relationship between time horizon condition, mood, and the positivity of recall in 
Experiment 2. When accounting for mood, the relationship between time horizon condition and 
the positivity of recall was significantly strengthened. 
 
 
           Mood 
 
Time Horizon condition           Positivity of Recall 
Appendix A 
 
  
β = .32,  
p = .001 
β = -.27,  
p = .004 
Without mood: β = .23, p = .015 
With mood: β = .32, p = .001 
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Appendix A 
 
Full instructions and writing prompt questions, along with example responses from both younger 
and older adults, in the expansive time horizon and limited time horizon writing conditions of 
Experiment 1. 
 
Expansive time horizon condition instructions: 
 
“People keep living longer and longer, yet official norms for retirement ages have not shifted. 
There are many more centenarians today than there were 20 years ago, and it is even possible 
that you might live to be 120. Yet much research shows that we spend too little time planning for 
a long future. As you answer the following questions, please plan for a future in which you live 
to be 120. Assume you will be in good health.”  
 
Example responses from a younger adult in the expansive time horizon condition: 
 
1. How would this [knowing you will live to 120] change your spending or saving? 
Rather than splurging on luxury items, I would try to be more practical in my spending and to 
save more to make sure that I am able to live comfortably until age 120. 
 
2. How would this [knowing you will live to 120] change what activities you spend time on? 
I would try to dedicate more time to regularly undergoing physical exercise more often to 
prolong my health. 
 
3. Describe how you would like to spend your days after you reach age 100.  
I would like to spend my days surrounded by friends and family, spending time with them. 
 
4. What goals would you have for the remaining years of your life if you knew you would live to 
be 120?  
I would want to succeed academically to make sure that I have a bright future and am financially 
stable at age 120. 
 
Example responses from an older adult in the expansive time horizon condition: 
 
1. How would this [knowing you will live to 120] change your spending or saving? 
I would use a higher percentage of income for saving goals. I would perhaps do remodeling of 
my house for possible disabilities. I would develop more activities or interests for a longer 
retirement time.  
 
2. How would this [knowing you will live to 120] change what activities you spend time on? 
Would develop more volunteer activities. Would develop skills for a “second career” following 
retirement.  
 
3. Describe how you would like to spend your days after you reach age 100.  
Reading, volunteering, traveling, exercise. Lunches with friends. 
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4. What goals would you have for the remaining years of your life if you knew you would live to 
be 120?  
Be financially independent. Volunteer more. Take classes at University. Travel. Develop second 
career. 
 
Limited time horizon condition instructions: 
 
“People can never know when life will end. For instance, you could die of a sudden heart attack 
or stroke or in a car accident at any time. Yet much research shows that we spend too little time 
focusing on the present moment. As you answer the following questions, please plan for a future 
in which you only live for 6 more months. Assume you will be in good health.”  
 
Example responses from a younger adult in the limited time horizon condition: 
 
1. How would this [knowing you have six months left to live] change your spending or saving? 
I would not be as frugal as I used to be. I would spend generously on everything and anything I 
need and want. I would probably spend most of my savings on me and my loved ones. 
 
2. How would this [knowing you have six months left to live] change what activities you spend 
time on? 
I would prioritize my activities to not waste any more time. I’d live for the present, doing things 
that bring more immediate pleasure and joy. I’d spend time with my loved ones, try things I’ve 
always wanted to do, and focus on my religious faith. 
 
3. Describe how you would like to spend your last day of life.  
My ideal last day of life would be filled with lots of happiness and laughter with my loved ones, 
whatever it is we are doing. I’d also be practicing my religious faith diligently. 
 
4. What goals would you have for the remaining months of your life if you knew you had only 
six more months to live?  
-I would want to make sure I spend more quality time with the people that matter. 
-Give more than receive  
-Make others smile 
-Practice religion 
 
Example responses from an older adult in the limited time horizon condition: 
 
1. How would this [knowing you have six months left to live] change your spending or saving? 
I would spend more freely, be more indulgent, and fret less about stretching my money.  
 
2. How would this [knowing you have six months left to live] change what activities you spend 
time on? 
I would travel more, visit friends and family and ‘bucket list’ places, and devote more time to 
hobbies in lieu of work. 
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3. Describe how you would like to spend your last day of life.  
Surrounded by friends and family, smiles, laughing, sharing any hidden or forgotten thoughts… 
Hugs all around!  A good meal with all. 
 
4. What goals would you have for the remaining months of your life if you knew you had only 
six more months to live?  
Catalogue my photos, scanning the rest.  Drive a Ferrari!  Make some progress on my boat 
model. Donate my time to helping young people and trying to spark their interest in science. 
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Appendix B 
 
Full instructions and writing prompt questions, along with two example responses from the 
control condition of Experiment 2. 
 
Example responses from a participant in the control condition: 
 
1. What was the most recent thing that you spent money on? This could be a bill that you paid or 
a purchase that you made. 
I just bought a family community agriculture shares (CSAs) for this season. 
 
2. What activities have you completed today? 
Worked, walked, did some light shopping. 
 
3. Describe what you plan to do immediately after completing this survey.  
Take a walk. 
 
4. What is one activity that you complete every day?  
Wake up, take a shower, eat, read a book, check email 
 
Example responses from a participant in the control condition: 
 
1. What was the most recent thing that you spent money on? This could be a bill that you paid or 
a purchase that you made. 
Shoes 
 
2. What activities have you completed today? 
Lunch and laundry 
 
3. Describe what you plan to do immediately after completing this survey.  
Write music 
 
4. What is one activity that you complete every day?  
Exercise 
 
 
 
 
